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Unfair Competition and Uncommon 
Sense 
Rebecca Tushnet∗
Mark McKenna’s Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm
 
1 is an 
important step forward in challenging trademark expansionism, going back 
to basics and asking us to assess for truth value several propositions that now 
seem so self-evident to lawyers and judges as to not require any empirical 
support at all.2 Like McKenna, I believe that if the law looked for the 
evidence behind present axioms of harm, it would not find much there. 
McKenna and I share an interest in empirical evidence on marketing and a 
desire to bring its insights to trademark law.3 But how did today’s theories of 
harm resulting from any kind of confusion, even confusion over unrelated 
goods, become “common sense” to judges, particularly when Mark Lemley 
asserts that modern Lanham Act jurisprudence represents “the death of 
common sense”?4
McKenna has traced the history of the harm argument in the courts,
 
5 
but figuring out exactly why that argument became persuasive—so 
persuasive, in fact, that courts now take it as factual beyond debate—is 
difficult. Common sense, often employed in legal reasoning, tends to hide 
its empirical and normative judgments in ways that make analysis difficult.6
 
 ∗ Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. 
 
 1. Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63 
(2009). 
 2. Id. at 67–68. 
 3. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008). 
 4. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 
1687 (1999). 
 5. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1839, 1851–73 (2007). 
 6. Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1006 (2006). 
Krieger & Fiske argue: 
When subjected to empirical scrutiny, “common sense” theories of how people 
perceive and judge themselves and others in their social environment often turn 
out to be wrong. Behavioral realism, understood as a prescriptive theory of judicial 
decision making, addresses this problem by proposing that, before judges use lay 
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McKenna, like other trademark restrictionists, tries to push back against 
today’s common sense with facts that will, as a whole, constitute a new (or 
even an old) common sense. His project limits trademark more tightly to 
protection against competition, with extensions only where necessary to 
avoid actual harm.7
In Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court 
highlighted the question of when judges ought to be willing to accept, infer, 
or presume that conclusion X follows from fact Y.
 I wish to briefly examine the role of common sense 
inferences, and how courts might deploy these inferences differently in 
trademark litigation. 
8 As a recent consumer-
protection case stated, under Twombly and Iqbal, the pleading standard 
underwent “a somewhat dramatic change.”9  Now “the non-conclusory 
factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be 
plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”10
 
or “common sense” psychological theories in their legal analysis, they should take 
reasonable steps to ensure that those theories are valid. 
 Thus, the 
court in Wright dismissed the complaint at issue, which had challenged the 
“100% Natural” label on Nature Valley cereal and cereal bars as false and 
Id.; Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 852–
53. Maroney argues: 
Common-sense ideas animate legal decisionmaking. Some have claimed that 
common sense is the “hidden transcript” of law, the “underlying and unconscious 
framework” guiding judgments as varied as witness credibility, marital property 
division, the insanity defense, and jurors’ assessment of eyewitness identifications. 
Though relatively unexplored in the legal literature, common sense is a crucial 
element in judicial decisionmaking, including in constitutional jurisprudence. 
Indeed, a recent citation study claims that common sense, though seldom 
scrutinized by scholars, was “the single most cited authority for an argument” the 
researchers could identify. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 7. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 4, at 1713. Lemley states: 
We do not need new legal rules here; what we need is the principled and vigorous 
application of the old rules. Courts should ask, as Brown does, exactly what new 
incentives do we need trademark law to create? How are consumers hurt by the 
conduct at issue? And what are the interests of society at large? 
Id. 
 8. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 9. Wright v. General Mills, Inc., No. 08-cv-1532, 2009 WL 3247148, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 
30, 2009). 
 10. Id. In particular, Iqbal and Twombly required facially plausible allegations of liability. If 
the facts alleged are more likely to be consistent with lack of liability than with liability, then the 
allegations of the complaint do not plausibly establish liability. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“Where 
a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of 
the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” (quoting Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 557)); id. at 1950–51 (stating that when a court considers the range of possible 
interpretations of the defendant’s alleged conduct, if the “more likely explanations” involve 
lawful, non-actionable behavior, the court should find that the plaintiff’s claim is not plausible). 
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misleading because the products actually were made with high fructose corn 
syrup, a substance that was allegedly not “natural.”11 To the court, this 
complaint contained little more than conclusory and speculative 
allegations.12 For example, it was insufficient simply to allege that members 
of the public were likely to have been deceived and to have made purchases 
because they believed that a “100% Natural” product would not have high 
fructose corn syrup.13
If these allegations are insufficient, how will general allegations that 
consumer confusion harms trademark owners fare? How should they fare, if 
we took Twombly and Iqbal seriously? Judges with different backgrounds may 
reach different conclusions about plausible inferences from the same set of 
facts
 
14: whereas Potter Stewart knew obscenity when he saw it, in order for us 
to agree on many issues, you would need to “[know] what I know when I see 
what I see.”15
Business-friendly judges of the kind now heavily populating the federal 
bench may not see plausible claims coming from consumers. But what 
happens when businesses sue other businesses, a more common trademark 
scenario? Iqbal insisted that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a 
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
 
16
 
 11. Wright, 2009 WL 3247148, at *5. 
 
The extent to which a harm story comports with judicial intuitions therefore 
may be even more important than in the past. Accepting McKenna’s 
evidence, trademark owners who challenge noncompeting uses should have 
to go beyond conclusory allegations of likely harm in order to proceed past 
the pleading stage. They should have to offer specific reasons why a 
particular use would do them harm, perhaps by precluding them from 
entering markets that they are otherwise likely to enter under the same 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. at *5–6 (discussing the standard of proof to establish liability). 
 14. Maroney, supra note 6, at 858 (discussing how judges’ invocations of different versions 
of common sense comport with their prior commitments). 
 15. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (1985); see also Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and 
Why, in “Acquaintance Rape” Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1437742 (investigating the interaction between 
individuals’ varying cultural values and their perceptions of legally relevant facts with respect to 
rape law); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going To 
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 838, 864–79 (2009) 
(reporting on a study showing that demographic variables profoundly affected the 
interpretation of videotape evidence, even though a majority of Supreme Court Justices 
specifically determined that the tape could only bear one reasonable interpretation); Maroney, 
supra note 6, at 864, 888 (cautioning against assumptions that others’ emotional lives are like 
our own and that others therefore perceive the world as we do; when judges do this, they may 
privilege cultural insiders’ reactions over outsiders’). 
 16. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
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mark. Requiring such allegations is not an unimaginable change. After Iqbal, 
there have been some fairly aggressive dismissals in trademark cases,17
Hensley Manufacturing v. ProPride, Inc.
 as 
well as some courts willing to treat rather far-fetched inferences as plausible. 
18 is an example of aggressively 
testing the theory of harm at the pleading stage. In this case, Hensley sued 
ProPride for using the name and reputation of Jim Hensley, whose business 
Hensley Manufacturing had allegedly bought, in advertising its trailer 
hitches. ProPride ads featured Jim Hensley’s name and evoked his 
reputation as a designer, providing only a small disclaimer of past affiliation 
with Hensley Manufacturing. The district court dismissed the complaint as 
fair use as a matter of law. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that 
the complaint failed to sufficiently allege use of a mark in a way that was 
likely to cause confusion as to its source.19 The court examined the ads at 
issue, as allowed on a motion to dismiss, and concluded that ProPride used a 
separate, dissimilar mark for its products. Although Hensley alleged 
confusion as to origin and sponsorship, the court found this a merely 
“conclusory and ‘formulaic recitation’” of the elements of an infringement 
claim.20 The court also agreed that ProPride had conclusively established 
that it had made a descriptive fair use of Jim Hensley’s name as a matter of 
law, rejecting ProPride’s argument that judgment on the pleadings was 
inappropriate in a trademark case.21 The court noted that while “facts may 
exist” that showed consumer confusion, “mere speculation” was insufficient: 
Hensley needed to allege those facts because without them he failed to state 
a claim that was plausible on its face.22 In the past, however, other courts 
have been much more willing to find confusion when named principals 
associated themselves with new businesses.23
 
 17. See, e.g., Rizzo v. South Bend Sporting Goods, No. 09-cv-189-bbc, 2009 WL 2495461, at 
*2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 12, 2009) (applying Iqbal to dismiss trade-infringement claims for failure to 
specify the facts “with enough detail to allow a plausible inference” that plaintiff’s design was 
distinctive and nonfunctional and that defendant copied those distinctive, nonfunctional 
elements). 
 
 18. Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 19. Id. at 610. 
 20. Id. at 611. 
 21. See id. at 612–13 (the portion of the opinion discussing the Fair-Use Defense). 
 22. Id. at 613. 
 23. See, e.g., Levitt Corp. v. Levitt, 593 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing the purchase of 
a housing construction company that led to an action against the seller for trademark 
infringement); In re Leslie Fay Cos., 216 B.R. 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (describing a 
proceeding filed by a clothing designer against the debtor clothing manufacturer, which had 
previously purchased his trademarks). The facts of those cases differ, but the point is that from 
the facts alleged—a trademark transferred from an individual to a company, plus subsequent 
use of the individual’s name to promote competing products—some courts would be willing to 
infer likely confusion at the pleading stage, or at least would have been before Iqbal. Of course, 
questioning such findings and asking whether confusion is the most plausible inference from 
those facts is important, as our common sense intuitions may differ. 
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SkyVenture Orlando, LLC v. SkyVenture Management, LLC24 is a contrasting 
example of a court’s willingness to credit some factual allegations that might 
seem strained. The court applied Iqbal’s plausibility standard to find that the 
mark IFLY could be a substitute or derivative of the mark SKYVENTURE 
such that anyone with the right to use SKYVENTURE would have the right 
to use IFLY. Without “an understanding of the factual context,” the court 
could not conclude that the dissimilarity was sufficient to dismiss the claim 
as a matter of law.25 McKenna’s account of the real function of modern 
trademark harm doctrine may go a long way towards explaining why the 
court cited copyright law on derivative works to justify its conclusion, which 
otherwise is a puzzling move.26
More generally, McKenna points to derivative works as the proper 
source of the logic, if any, of finding harm to trademark owners from 
confusion in unrelated markets. I am struck by the lack of empirical 
justification for giving copyright owners rights over derivative markets as 
well. The question of whether copyright owners would increase their output 
if given rights over certain uses is often resolved by normative decisions 
about appropriate markets that they ought to control, rather than by any 
evidence that derivative markets affect incentives.
 
27 Indeed, the role of 
empirics in copyright policy generally should not make us sanguine. Very 
little evidence supported the proposition that term extension would support 
or increase creative production, while basic economic theory and 
calculations of the present discounted value of a twenty-year term extension 
at the end of a term that was already life plus fifty indicated that incentives 
would not noticeably increase. Nonetheless, Congress and the Supreme 
Court accepted the irrational incentive claims.28
 
 24. SkyVenture Orlando, LLC v. SkyVenture Mgmt., LLC, No. 6:09-cv-396-orl-19KRS, 2009 
WL 2496553 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2009). 
 More generally, there is 
very limited evidence that copyright does much of anything to incentivize 
 25. Id. at *6. 
 26. See id. (citing Superchips Inc. v. Street & Performance Elecs. Inc., No. 6:00-CV-896-
ORL31KRS, 2001 WL 697948, at *5–6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2001)). 
 27. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related 
Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 329–30 (2005) (recognizing a weak empirical basis for the 
derivative-works right and offering a theoretical competition-based justification); Derek E. 
Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing the Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345, 347–48 
(2008) (arguing that there is no defensible justification for the derivative-works right); Thomas 
F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1296 n.68 (2008) 
(concluding that the empirical evidence supporting the congestion-externality justification for 
derivative-works right is mixed at best); Stewart Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1215–17 (1996) (criticizing standard economic justifications for the 
derivative-works right). 
 28. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213–14 (2003) (giving deference to Congress’s 
routine decisions to adjust copyright terms); see also Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Elder v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 
WL 1041846 (providing an economic analysis of a twenty-year extension of the copyright term). 
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creative production, given how hard it is for people to make a living as 
artists.29
The underlying issue is that disputes over facts reflect different value 
structures. We can’t solve our disagreements over whether trademark should 
be a property right or a right of competition by punting to facts. Precisely 
because our precommitments will affect what we think the facts of a 
particular case are, we can, as any Lanham Act case featuring dueling surveys 
will demonstrate, fight just as hard about the facts as about the principles, 
and for the same reasons.
 
30 Thus, another piece of the trademark-expansion 
puzzle is Barton Beebe’s empirical finding that “intent” is a key indicator of 
outcomes in trademark cases.31 As Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, among 
others, have pointed out, the intent factor is highly manipulable, because 
the question “intent to do what?” is not settled by the case law.32
The first step towards defensible outcomes is to make our normative 
disagreements clear, although this clarity is no guarantee that normative 
disputes will somehow become tractable. It is here that McKenna’s article is 
extremely helpful, establishing that the argument for harm from 
noncompeting uses has to rely on possible market preclusion instead of 
actual damage that confusion causes to a brand. 
 It may be a 
fact that the defendant knew about the plaintiff’s mark before adopting its 
own, but courts go beyond facts when presuming—or declining to 
presume—bad faith from knowledge plus adoption. 
I am left with a relatively minor suggestion for applying McKenna’s 
insights: Even if courts remain resistant to the general critiques of 
broadened trademark liability, it would be possible to move the doctrine 
 
 29. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform (U. of Michigan Law & Economics, Olin 
Working Paper No. 09-018; Univ. of Michigan Public Law, Working Paper No. 168), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474929 (exploring how the current copyright system is failing its 
intended beneficiaries). 
 30. See Kahan, Hoffman, & Braman, supra note 15, at 905. The authors state: 
What’s not nearly so well understood however, is the threat that competing 
understandings of fact pose to a liberal society. Indeed, forms of advocacy that 
feature seemingly neutral factual claims about how to promote societal welfare 
(“optimal deterrence,” “cost-benefit analysis,” “contingent valuation” and the like) 
are thought to be among the practices that dissipate illiberal conflict by avoiding 
reference to more contentious judgments of value. It might seem natural to see 
judicial idioms that focus on “facts” as conflict avoiding for the same reason. But 
because we inevitably recur to our cultural values to evaluate empirical claims 
about what conditions threaten our welfare and what policies promote it, styles of 
argumentation that feature facts can polarize us every bit as much as one that deals 
with differences of value in a transparent way. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 31. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1608, 1623 (2006). 
 32. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 
98 TRADEMARK REP. 1345, 1370 (2008). 
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substantially by changing the treatment of presumptions at the end of a case 
as well as by tightening pleading standards. In eBay v. MercExchange, LLC,33 
the Supreme Court rejected a presumption of irreparable harm, and thus a 
nearly inevitable injunction, following automatically from a finding of patent 
infringement. Since then, courts have been struggling with whether eBay 
applies to all kinds of intellectual property. One court of appeals has 
reversed a preliminary injunction on the ground that Lanham Act plaintiffs 
are no more exempt than patentees from the case-by-case balancing of the 
equities required by eBay.34 Trademark protectionists, however, argue that 
the consumer-protection rationale underlying trademark is so distinct from 
the property/incentive rationale of copyright and patent that presumptions 
of irreparable harm remain appropriate in trademark cases, even if not in 
other intellectual-property cases.35
In the end, if common sense is truly dead in trademark law, then courts 
need to revive it. The kinds of facts McKenna brings to our attention are no 
substitute for common sense, but perhaps they can begin to inform our 
inferences about actionable harm. Even in a pervasively branded, 
conglomerate world, there are still good reasons to think that unfair 
competition requires competition. When that isn’t present, in order to avoid 
oxymoron, we need to reconstruct, and substantially curtail, our 
understanding of the harm of infringement along the lines McKenna 
suggests. 
 But of course, if McKenna is correct and 
the real harm in noncompeting-goods cases is market foreclosure analogous 
to the derivative works right in copyright, then eBay should apply to 
infringement claims with respect to most noncompeting goods. 
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